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This research studies the effects of the euro-crisis on the legitimacy of democracy. Within the research 
field, the definition of democracy has become a very problematic. This obliged me to abandon the idea of 
using a fixed concept of democracy, forcing to focus on the interaction of the crisis with the 
conceptualization of democracy itself. Democracy becomes a contested concept, not only within the 
academic democratic theory, but essentially as an ideological concept, a product of social struggles.  
Ideology refers to how human beings live their life as conscious actors, making sense of their own actions 
and those of others. Approaching democracy “as ideology”, means to “focus on the way it operates in the 
formation and transformation of human subjectivity”. (Therborn, 1999: 2) Within the Marxist tradition, 
ideology is built upon a dialectical relation with praxis and political economy. (Therborn 1999, Althusser 
1972, Zizek 2006) By no means should this approach of democracy thus be interpreted as idealistic - 
disregarding the practical forms, practices and relations. A dialectic materialist approach of democracy 
considers the dialectic relation between sub- and superstructure of society, and between objective living 
conditions and human subjectivity.
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Democracy has had an important function to legitimize the institutions of capitalist governance. Therborn 
(1977) identifies some tendencies that induced the democratic possibility of capitalism: It requires (1) the 
establishment of a centralized state and the necessity of national unification. It has (2) an inherent 
tendency of economic growth en technological development which creates room for temporary social 
compromises. At the same time, there is (3) a tendency towards internal competition within the ruling 
class, and (4) the impersonal role of exploitation involving rather the rule of capital than personal 
domination of the bourgeoisie, enables other classes to co-govern a capitalist state. These tendencies do 
not make democracy inherent to capitalism. While the bourgeois classes established democratic 
deliberation and public sphere as a governance alternative to transcendental feudal titles (Habermas 1991, 
Avritzer 2002), “democracy” had always been restricted on the base of class, sex, race and opinion. What 
we consider democracy today developed through a close – though often antagonistic - relationship with 
capitalist political economy, as a product of continuous struggles of social emancipation against 
capitalism. The Labour movement – itself the product of capitalist development - has been the major 
driving force for this democratization in Western societies. (Therborn 1977) Its struggle for social 
emancipation has been directed in a institutionalization of political democracy, giving the purely formal 
democracy a substance through an extension of participation the establishment of social rights and the 
social welfare state. 
Every form of legitimacy is based upon the shared acceptance of certain kinds of norms and goal values 
(Bodansky 1999). The existence of democratic legitimacy is therefore dependent on the social consensus 
about what democracy “is” or “should be”. This implies a democratic hegemony, and thus that there is a 
power, or Gramscian-style power-coalition, which sustains a hegemonic interpretation and 
institutionalization of democracy. The often antagonist co-evolution of Western European 
democratization with capitalism relied on different power-coalitions and configurations based on 
compromises between the working class, peasants, internal fractions of the bourgeoisie and other groups 
in society. (Therborn 1977)  
In recent decades, the social consensus in Europe was based upon the Washington-consensus. This 
approach towards society, based on market-efficiency and competition, draws a post-political, seemingly 
post-ideological world, with politics-turned-into-technical-management. (Brown 2011) It assumes that 
liberal democratic capitalism as the end of human evolution. It serves as the base for the hegemonic 
interpretation of democracy today, the elitist liberal model (Santos 2012). Based on Schumpeter’s’ model, 
it restricts democracy to the electoral choice between elites, within ever more restricted public sphere. 
Although this model achieved nearly universal characteristics, in its peripheral regions, the question of its 
particular application becomes more complex. In dependent capitalist nations, the internal dynamics of 
the ruling class are largely dependent on an external center and the economic base is extremely fragile 
and vulnerable to international crisis; this reduces the room for maneuver and social compromise on 
which modern western democracy is built.  It also hinders the development of impersonal rule and a 
limited growth of the organized labour movement; factors that had been crucial in the development of 
democracy in the core. (Therborn 1977) 
The consequence has been a very dubious relation between the Portuguese ruling class and the national 
state and consequently to national democracy. Sousa Santos (2012) defends that for one - 
internationalized - fraction the national state is too small.  It looks abroad for export-markets, partners and 
investment opportunities. It pushed Portugal towards European integration after the loss of the colonial 
empire, as Europe meant a “solution” for the role it was never able to develop. (Santos 2012) Europe 
should have been an incentive to reform the judicial system, to regulate corruption, develop national 
infrastructure and enable Portugal, to enter the Globalized world on a stronger basis. The other fraction 
was just too underdeveloped and localized to have any dominant influence on public policies. It had to 
retract to corruption and fiscal evasion as a dominant political strategy towards the state. (Santos 2012 
:61) These para-statal informal power structures and networks of corruption and nepotism – which served 
as an alternative for the bourgeois centralized state (Ruivo 2000) - undermine the project for a liberal-
democratic Rechtsstaat. 
As a symbolic contrast with the Estado Novo dictatorship, democracy nevertheless occupied a particular 
position in the trans-class consensus after the revolutionary period. Key for this consensus about 
democracy was a compromise based upon the “ideas of the revolution” and “Europe”. The revolution 
echoed social justice and equality, and institutionalized in the late development of a – feeble - welfare 
state with social rights including free education and a universal healthcare system. (Santos 2012) 
“Europe” meant the perspective of economic and technological development, the promise of accessing 
“civilization”, and opening of new markets for the elites, as well as an escape from the internal economic 
and social conflicts of the PREC through supra-national governance and subsidies.(Lobo 2003, 2011, 
Santos 2012) 
As long as power-relations didn’t change, there was no breaking up of the consensus which sustains the 
dominant hegemony. Here the dynamics of the political economy are crucial. The current crisis in 
Portugal - consequence of the complex dynamics behind the global financial crisis and the internal 
imbalances within the European capitalist unification resulting in the Eurocrisis – has brought an end to 
the Portuguese consensus about democracy (as it has done in other peripheral countries).
ii
 The concept of 
crisis is crucial here. Crisis refers to an internal contradiction within the system itself, as if it would be a 
dysfunction of an organism. (Habermas 1975) It is not primarily an external condition, but the 
consequence of a qualitative change within the system itself, based on a historical quantitative process, 
which was already taking place. The divergence of ideas about democracy is not really a new situation, as 
are the political-economic processes that led to it. The imbalances in the euro-area and the 
unsustainability of the public and private debt are the consequence of a long process of neoliberal 
economic and monetary unification and capitalist globalization, which led to a deterioration of the 
national economy, debt-fueled growth and a de facto loss of sovereignty to financial capitalism. In the 
same way, different narratives about democracy have their predecessors. Portuguese citizens already had 
a high distrust in the political elite before the crisis, for example; this fact being exemplified by previous 
high rates of non-participation and abstention during elections, etc. Moreover, many of the narratives are 
built upon collective memories of past social struggles and established forms of organization. 
The contradictions in the economy have put a huge pressure on the democratic consensus in Portugal, as 
well as on the ideas of “Europe” and “the revolution” which played a crucial role in the consensus. Where 
Europe and the revolution stood for the consensus about democracy, today’s different approaches towards 
both symbolize the emerged dissensus. Where Europe for the ruling class still means civilization, 
financial and economic salvation, and necessary technical reforms, protestors see it as undemocratic, 
unjust, capital-oriented, core-dominated and equalize it with a foreign occupation. A similar thing 
happens to the “ideas of the revolution”. Its constitution and social rights are seen by the democratically 
elected government as unsustainable; a threat to the Portuguese economy, its application is degraded as 
“political activism”. For the opponents of austerity it is a safeguard against the illegitimate government 
policies, it represents the rights which are taken away, it represent the resistance against “authoritarian 
rule” of a “privileged elite”.iii 
As all sides of the conflict still claim to uphold democracy, the dissensus is projected into differing 
interpretations of the concept of democracy itself. As a result the liberal elitist democratic hegemony 
disrupts into the emergence of a range of different – often contradicting - narratives reflecting different 
historical backgrounds and social positions. The result is what Boaventura Sousa Santos (2007: lxiii) 
would call a demo-diversity; “the peaceful or conflicting coexistence [...] of different models and 
practices of democracy”. While the governing elite  - based on the liberal elitist interpretation of 
democracy - still considers itself as the only legitimate elected representatives of the people, the 
personification of democracy and reason, this is disputed by ever larger layers of the population during 
the protests. It lead to the appearance of new social movements and rising protests - against the austerity 
policies and the social crisis - claiming the banners of “real democracy”,  with new ideas and the opening 
of the public debate. Within all forms of opposition, there seemed a consensus that there was something 
very wrong with the state of affairs with democracy in Portugal. Examples are the slogans about the 
opposition against the 1%, the general opposition against the loss of sovereignty and troika governance. 
As the trade unions and the left claim they are defending democracy, by defending social rights, social 
justice and sovereignty they contrast it with the undemocratic lack of political choice in the TINA-
doctrine and the dictatorship of the financial markets.
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 All protestors defend a necessary extension – or at 
least a status quo - of substantive and procedural dimensions of democracy and defend what Gills et all 
(1993) and Sousa Santos and Avritzer (2005) would call a more “high intensity democracy” contrasting 
with its (neo)liberal-democratic “low-intensity” form. More radical layers however, the indignados and 
acampada movement in particular, radicalized the revolt with the existent institutionalization of 
democracy, demanding “Democracia real já” (real democracy now!). This “real democracy” reflected 
broad oppositions against representative democracy, the oppositions against the concept of political party 
itself and the framing of "politicians" or politics in general by nature as corrupt and bad. But even within 
these movements, they were divided about a broad range of issues concerning democracy. Classic divides 
emerged such as ‘conflict versus compromise’ in decision making, about voting procedures or deciding 
by consensus, about the establishment of more permanent structures in the meetings or not, the possibility 
of having representatives or spokesmen, the agreement of topic-specific working groups, the time-limits 
of deliberation, the acceptance of organized groups within the debates, etc… And while the common 
effects of the Global character of the financial crisis and the Euro-crisis strengthened cosmopolitan 
international solidarities, such as the initiatives around “Global Spring”, at the same time the external 
interventions strengthened the more nationalist appeal of national sovereignty in other layers. The 
divergence is even wider if we compare with the perspectives of other oppositional groups, organizations 
and parties which were not active in the acampada movement or quitted the acampadas during the debates 
due to what some called “unworkability”, “lack of freedom of organization” or even “undemocratic 
methods”. 
The dialectic materialist analysis showed that the economic crisis is reflected in emerging contradictions 
in the narratives about democracy. These narratives range from the formal elitist perspective of the 
policymakers to a purely substantive view on the side of the trade unions, while the acampada movement 
expressed wide range of models and deliberative practices. The lack of consensus about the meaning of 
democracy because of lack of social consensus explains in part the problem of the legitimacy of 
democracy in Southern Europe. A common element of all narratives however, is that they all defended 
their perspectives within the democratic framework. It provides an explanation for the reason why there 
are institutions considered to be democratic by one of the sides of the conflict while at the same time, 
anti-democratic by another, providing a level of legitimacy to the possibility that it may be overthrown or 
neglected. It can help to explain how democracy can become obsolete in spite of public convictions they 
defend democracy. 
This analysis also shows that the models of democratic theory are reflected in the different narratives; or 
is it the other way around? Zizek’s (2006: 37) Parallax view on democracy  proposes that today’s 
“struggle for democracy […] is in what it will mean”, but within this struggle object and subject are 
dialectically mediated. The obvious conclusion is that social scientists analyzing democracy have 
themselves a role in the formation of democracy, and that they consequently have to choose sides in the 
social conflict. 
                                                          
i
 This opposes the mainstream empirical approach in comparative politics which uses a fixed formal definition of 
democracy such as used in Lipset (1959), Huntington (1991), Przworksi (1993), or the new ICS-publication “A 
qualidade da democracia em Portugal: a visão dos cidadãos” by Pinto et all (2013) 
ii
 The crisis is the consequence of an interplay between dynamics of geographical uneven development (Hadjimichalis 
2011), neoliberal financial deregulation, the consequences of monetary unification in a non-optimal currency-area (De 
Grauwe 2010) and has been deepened by the austerity-policies themselves (Krugman 2012). 
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 This is a beautifull demonstration of Göran Therborns’(1999) Ego- and Alter-ideology 
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